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BDI agents act in response to external inputs and their internal
plan library. Understanding the root cause of BDI agent action is
often difficult, and in this paper we present a dialogue based ap-
proach for explaining the behaviour of a BDI agent. We consider
two dialogue participants who may have different views regarding
the beliefs, plans and external events which drove agent action
(encoded via traces). These participants make utterances which
incrementally reveal their traces to each other, allowing them to
identify divergences in the traces, or to conclude that their traces
agree. In practice, we envision a human taking on the role of a
dialogue participant, with the BDI agent itself acting as the other
participant. The dialogue then facilitates explanation, understand-
ing and debugging of BDI agent behaviour. After presenting our
formalism and its properties, we describe our implementation of
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1 INTRODUCTION
Belief, Desire Intention (BDI) based approaches to agent reasoning
are very popular, with applications ranging from air traffic manage-
ment [? ], to e-Health [? ]. The formal basis of BDI systems facilitate
formal validation and verification, and provide guarantees as to
their actions [? ] and to the states the system will, or will not reach.
However, understanding why a BDI-based system acted as it did
is difficult, requiring working through plans and subplans while
tracking the system’s internal state.
Researchers have noted that dialogue is a potentially useful tool
to explain the behaviour of complex AI artefacts [? ], and in this
paper we propose a dialogue based approach to reasoning about
BDI system behaviour. As our departure point, we consider the case
where two dialogue participants (which we may also refer to as
agents) hold — possibly different — views about the content of a BDI
program and the environment in which it executes. Our dialogue
is then designed to pinpoint where disagreement between dialogue
participants exists. Such disagreement could, for example, lie in
different views regarding what plans drive the BDI system; their
priorities; or differences in inputs or initial beliefs of the system. Our
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dialogue then enables at least one dialogue participant to locate a
disagreement (if one exists); and alternatively allows it to determine
if no disagreement exists. We assume that in the case of multiple
disagreements the dialogue can take place multiple times, with
the dialogue participants’ beliefs updated between each dialogue
instance. Importantly, we do not consider how participants update
their beliefs during or following a dialogue, with such belief revision
lying outside the scope of the current work.
Our main contribution is the description and formalisation of the
explanatory dialogue, enabling the identification of, and explana-
tion for, the reasons why a BDI system behaved as it did. We focus
on this formal aspect here and emphasise that natural language
generation and utterance presentation from similar work (e.g., [?
? ]) lies outside the scope of this paper. Unlike e.g., [? ? ] we do
not provide a formal argumentation-based underpinning to our
dialogue.
Section 2 introduces a simple BDI language and formalises our
environment. Section 3 introduces the dialogue. We examine the
properties of the dialogue in Section 4 and provide an illustrative
example in Section 5. Section 6 contains detailed discussion, in-
cluding a comparison with existing work. Section 7 concludes by
considering avenues for future research.
2 THE SIMPLEBDI LANGUAGE
We introduce a very simple BDI language, SimpleBDI, which wewill
use to illustrate our ideas. SimpleBDI is designed to be as simple as
possible, as its primary purpose is to demonstrate the feasibility of
our approach and enable its formalisation. SimpleBDI contains the
constructs which lie at the heart of more complex BDI languages,
and is therefore an appropriate underlying representation.
A SimpleBDI program consists of an ordered list of plans Π of
the form πid : B → I . B (the plan’s guard) is a set of first order
ground predicates over some language L, and I is a [U ,do(a)] pair.
In turn, U is a set of belief updates of the form +b,−b where b is
a ground first order predicate, and a is an action, again denoted
using a ground first order predicate. Since some plans may only
update beliefs rather than execute an action, we introduce a special
symbol null to denote the lack of action. In addition, we assume the
existence of an empty plan πnull : [] → [[],do(null)]. Plans within
Π are assumed to be ordered by preference, and we write π > π ′
if π is preferable to π ′ (i.e., iff the index of π is smaller than the
index of π ′ in Π). Unlike most BDI languages, SimpleBDI does not
explicitly model goals. However, goals can be encoded through the
introduction of a predicate of the form дoal(д), which is added and
removed as a belief at appropriate times as part of plan execution.
SimpleBDI programs execute plans based on beliefs and changes
in the environment (percepts). The latter is captured by an input
trace τe of events external to the agent. Each event is a list of belief
updates, V , of the form +b or −b containing a single ground first
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order predicate. The list of belief updates for a single event cannot
contain contradictory belief updates, i.e., +b,−b < V .
The executor
1
of a SimpleBDI program maintains a set of inter-
nal beliefs — denoted B — encoded as a set of ground first order
predicates, and is formally represented at a point in time as a tuple
E = ⟨B,Π,π ,τe ,aex , staдe⟩
Here, B is a set of the executor’s beliefs; Π is its plan library; π
the current plan selected for execution; τe is the input trace; and
aex the (external) action executed by the executor agent at that
time. staдe ∈ {s, p, e} captures the current state of the executor;
SimpleBDI programs run through repeated perception (p), plan
selection (s), and plan execution (e) stages. Given a set of plans Π
representing a SimpleBDI program and an input trace τe the initial
state of the executor is
E = ⟨[],Π,null ,τe ,null , p⟩
Figure 1 summarises the semantics of SimpleBDI describing how
the tuple representing the executor evolves as a transition system
(i.e., if Ei → Ei+1 in Fig. 1 then Ei becomes Ei+1 as the system
executes). A program execution trace is then the sequence of tuples
[E1, . . . ,En ] where Ei+1 is obtained by executing a program over
the input trace found in Ei until the input trace is empty; the ∅
symbol denotes the end of program execution.
In the perception phase (p), the top of the input trace (τe ) is
consumed, updating the set of beliefs B. The update itself is done
through the update function, which takes a set of belief updates
and a set of beliefs as input, and returns an updated set of beliefs.
Note that during the remaining phases, no beliefs are consumed; a
null perception is therefore consumed during these phases.
The plan selection phase (s) proceeds by selecting an applicable
plan using the select and applicable functions respectively. The
former iterates through the plan library in order of preference,
while the latter deems a plan applicable by checking whether the
plan’s beliefs do, or do not, appear in the belief base. If no applicable
plan is found, then the empty plan πnull is returned. The selected
plan is recorded, to be used in the next phase.
Finally, the plan execution phase (e) takes the selected plan and
updates the belief base according to the plan’s effects. In addition,
any action a executed due to the plan is recorded.
Example 1. Listing 1 shows a simple program in SimpleBDI (i.e.,
the plans, Π, used by the program executor). In this program a robotic
system (for instance a Mars Rover), must move from its starting posi-
tion to a waypoint and then on to a final location to take a sample. It
does this if it believes it has received a message take_sample_message.
It then uses move1 to move from the starting point to the waypoint (if
it believes the terrain is safe) and then uses move2 to move from the
waypoint to the location where it should take the sample by drilling
(again if it believes the terrain is safe). We omit "do( null )" for plans
with no associated actions.
Code Listing 1
1t a k e_ s amp l e_me s s a g e −>
2− t a k e_ samp l e_mes sage , + g o a l _ a t _ l o c a t i o n
3
1
We use the term "executor" rather than agent to differentiate this entity from the
agents undertaking dialogue about the execution of the SimpleBDI program.
4s a f e _ t e r r a i n , a t _ s t a r t , g o a l _ a t _ l o c a t i o n −>
5+ a t_waypo in t , − a t _ s t a r t ,
6do ( move1 )
7
8s a f e _ t e r r a i n , a t _waypo in t , g o a l _ a t _ l o c a t i o n −>
9+ a t _ l o c a t i o n , −a t_waypo in t ,
10− g o a l _ a t _ l o c a t i o n , + goa l _ t a k e _ s amp l e ,
11do ( move2 )
12
13a t _ l o c a t i o n , g o a l _ t a k e _ s amp l e −>
14−goa l _ t a k e _ s amp l e ,
15do ( d r i l l )
So for instance, the second plan (lines 5-8) states that if the agent
perceives that it is at the start, and the terrain is safe and it has
received a message telling it to take a sample then it will move to
the waypoint (via the external action move1). At this point, if it no
longer perceives the terrain is safe it will not move further. However
if it continues to believe the terrain is safe it will move to the final
location (using the plan in lines 10-15) and which in turn triggers the
remaining plan in the program: to drill for a sample (lines 17-19).
Given a program and an initial state — which includes an input
trace — the state of the executor at each step of the program execu-
tion trace describes the internal state of the executor and its effects
(actions) on the environment.
3 DIALOGUES
The semantics of SimpleBDI allow us to determine how a program
will execute (for a given initial state). However, systems executing
such programs are often opaque. The aim of this paper is to help
facilitate an understanding of program behaviour.
To this end we consider a dialogue between two participants
who may have partial access to the program execution trace, and
have their own model of the executor. Our dialogue seeks to iden-
tify differences between the participants’ models so as to identify
disagreements. Such differences could arise due to differences in
the plans the dialogue participants believe the executor has; a diver-
gence with regards to the beliefs they believe the executor holds;
or different beliefs they have with regards to the various traces.
If one of the participants is the program executor (whose trace is
correct), and another is a human or system trying to understand the
executor’s behaviour, then identifying a disagreement means that
an error in the latter’s assumptions or reasoning has been identi-
fied, and doing so serves as a form of explanation of the executor’s
behaviour.
We begin by providing the intuition behind our dialogue, after
which we describe a model of the dialogue participants. Finally, we
formalise the dialogue by describing the utterances participants
may make in the dialogue (c.f., dialogue games [? ]).
3.1 Dialogue — Intuitions
When applying the semantics correctly, differences between exe-
cution traces for dialogue participants arise due to differing plans
within agent plan libraries or plan precedence, or due to differ-
ent perceptions from the environment.The only externally visible
effects of a running system are the actions it executes, and our dia-
logue therefore begins by having one participant asking the other
why, or why not, an action was performed at some time.
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⟨B, Π, π , [], aex , p⟩ → ∅
⟨B, Π, π , [V |τe ], aex , p⟩ → ⟨update(V , B), Π, π , τe , null, s⟩
⟨B, Π, π , [null |τe ], aex , s⟩ → ⟨B, Π, select (B, Π), τe , null, e⟩
⟨B, Π, πid : B → [U , do(a)], [null |τe ], aex , e⟩ → ⟨update(U , B), Π, πid : B → [U , do(a)], τe , a, p⟩
update([], B) = B
update([+b |B], B) = B ∪ {b }
update([−b |B], B) = B\{b }
select (B, []) = πnull
select (B, [πid : B → I |Π]) =
{
πid if applicable(B, B)
select (B, Π) otherwise
applicable(B, []) = ⊤
applicable(B, b : B) =
{
applicable(B, B) if b ∈ B
⊥ otherwise
applicable(B, ¬b : B) =
{
applicable(B, B) if b < B
⊥ otherwise
Figure 1: SimpleBDI semantics. ∅ denotes termination of execution.
Let us consider the evolution of a possible explanatory dialogue.
If a dialogue participant asks another why an action did not take
place, the latter can respond by asking the former why they believe
an action did take place. If on the other hand, a participant asks why
an action did take place, the explanation (i.e., response) involves
identifying the (executed) plan which triggered the action. When
asked why a plan was executed, the response involves demonstrat-
ing that the set of beliefs which triggered the plan held. When
asked why some belief held, a response involves either presenting
the percept which caused the belief, or the plan which led to the
belief being adopted. In the latter case, the dialogue can continue
by providing an explanation for the plan.
When an assertion regarding a belief is presented it is also possi-
ble for a disagreement to occur, with the other dialogue participant
asserting that the belief does not hold at the relevant point in time.
In such a situation, the dialogue can continue with the presentation
of a plan or percept which removes the belief. In the former case,
the dialogue can continue by providing an explanation for the plan.
In the latter case, the presentation of the percept should identify a
disagreement between the dialogue participants.
The above paths through the dialogue help us identify natural
points of dialogue termination. When a percept justifying a belief
is presented, no further explanation is possible, as such a percept
originates from outside the BDI system. When stating that a plan
was executed, if the other dialogue participant is not aware of the
plan (i.e., the plan is not present in their plan library), or if they
believe that a higher precedence plan exists, then a disagreement
has been identified which cannot be resolved by further discussion
regarding system execution. Finally, If one dialogue participant
asks another why an action took place (or didn’t take place), and
the latter believes that the action didn’t take place (did take place),
then no further discussion is possible.
3.2 Dialogue Participant Model
A dialogue participant is a tuple ⟨M,O,O⟩ whereM,O andO are
program execution traces of a BDI program, and |M| = |O| = |O|.
Informally M represents the participants model of what should
have happened – i.e., the program execution trace they believe to
be correct, O represents their (partial) understanding of what the
other participant’s trace looks like. O then captures commitments
or constraints that emerge on the other participant due to their
utterances – specifically plans the other participant has explicitly
committed to not having been selected; beliefs explicitly commit-
ted to not having been perceived on the input trace; and actions
explicitly committed to not having been performed2.
We index a specific time point within the execution trace using
array notation (e.g., M[5]). Where the context is clear, we index
individual portions of a BDI executor’s state at a specific time in
the same manner, identifying the program with a superscript. For
example, aMex [5] refers to aex of BDI program execution traceM at
time 5. Equivalently, if — for example — some x ∈ τMe [5], we may
say that x holds in τMe at time 5. We refer to elements within O as
B,π etc, indexing individual entries by time. We note that — in the
present system — the plan library Π does not change, and therefore
abuse notation by referring to it without identifying a specific time
point; we assume that any operations onΠM ,ΠO andΠ apply to all
time indices. Finally, we also assume that staдeM [T ] = staдeO[T ]
for all 0 ≤ T < |M|.
Utterances made by one dialogue participant can affect the other
participant’s view of the utterer. Therefore, given one dialogue
participant ⟨M,O,O⟩, we refer to the other dialogue participant
as ⟨M ′,O′,O
′
⟩. We can, for example, index the other dialogue
participant’s view of its own input trace at time T as τ ′e
M [T ].
The purpose of our dialogue is to allow a participant to iden-
tify disagreements or inconsistencies between itself and the other
participant. Such disagreements can be recognised as occurring
between the M and O traces, or between theM and O traces.
• For an indexT , if BO[T ] ⊈ BM [T ], or if B[T ]∩BM [T ] , ∅
then a disagreement in belief has been identified. More specif-
ically, the disagreement rests on beliefs (BO[T ]\BM [T ])
∪(B[T ] ∩ BM [T ]).
• If ΠO ⊈ ΠM , or if π > π ′ according to ΠM , and π ≯ π ′
according to ΠO , or if there is some π ∈ Π,ΠM then a
2
We observe that some elements of the tuples stored within O are therefore not used
within our system.
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disagreement w.r.t. the plan library has been identified. Such
a dispute revolves around plans π ,π ′ or π respectively.
• For an index T , if π O[T ],π [T ] , null and πM [T ] , π O[T ]
or π = π [T ] then a disagreement in the executing plan has
been identified. This dispute centers on plan π .
• If at any time T the head of τMe differs from the head of τ
O
e
and τ Oe , null , then a disagreement in perception (w.r.t. the
respective heads of the lists) has been identified.
• Finally, if at any timeT , aMex [T ] , a
O
ex [T ] , null or a
M
ex [T ] =
aex [T ], then a disagreement in action has been identified,
based on the actions identified.
Note that in the above, for a disagreement to occur, the relevant
element of O and O must not be ∅. This reflects the fact that as the
dialogue progresses, O and O are updated and a disagreement only
occurs when an explicit difference is found.
3.3 Dialogue Initiation and Termination
At the start of a dialogue all elements of O and O at all times are set
to null (or ∅ for beliefs), reflecting a lack of knowledge a dialogue
participant has about the other participant.
The dialogue begins when one dialogue participant makes a
why(A,T ) or why(¬A,T ) move, asking why an action, A was, or
was not performed at time T .
The dialogue continues as additional utterances are made by the
participants in response to previous utterances. Utterances are open
until their closure condition occurs in the dialogue, at which point
they are closed. The dialogue terminates when no open utterances
exist, i.e., when there is no legal move that any dialogue participant
can make. Once the dialogue terminates, disagreement(s) can be
identified using the procedure described in the previous section.
3.4 Utterances
During a dialogue, participants make different utterances (a.k.a.
moves). Table 1 describes these, when they can be made, and their
intuitive meaning, aligning with the high level dialogue description
provided in Section 3.1. Note thatwhy(A,T ) can be used to initiate
the dialogue, or made in response to awhy(¬A,T ) move. In other
words, if a participant asks "Why did action A not occur?", asking
"Why do you think action A should have occurred?" is a valid
response, as it will allow for a disagreement in views to be detected.
Also note that the assertion of a plan (assert(π ,T )) can be made
in response to asking why an action took place, why a belief was
instantiated, or in response to the claim that some other plan should
have been executed. The intuition behind the latter is that a dialogue
participant suggests that another plan should have been executed.
The dialogue can then continue to investigate why this is the case.
While Table 1 specifies what utterance can be made in response
to a move, the contents of a legal utterance are further constrained.
Table 2 provides a semi-formal description of each utterance, stating
when a move can be made (the move condition), the move’s closure
condition, and move’s effect on dialogue participants. Within the
table, _ is used, as in Prolog, to indicate that any instantiation of
the relevant value may exist.
We assume that the same move cannot be repeated. A dialogue
D is then a sequence of moves [D1, . . . ,Dn ] obeying all dialogue
constraints (i.e., "Follows" requirements of Table 1, and "Move" and
"Closure" conditions of Table 2). Note that we do not specify an
explicit turn taking mechanism. Rather, dialogue participants make
utterances in response to an open move subject to the move condi-
tions. Different instantiations of the dialogue are therefore possible
whereby, for example, an agent can respond to a question about
why a plan holds by responding with a single belief assertion at
a time, or by asserting all elements of the plan’s guard simultane-
ously. While this may have an impact on dialogue understanding
and dialogue length (which we will categorise as part of future
work), the entire dialogue family will yield equivalent results in
terms of the dialogue’s goals (i.e., in identifying disagreements).
Moves such as accept(π ,T )which always close a dialogue branch
either explicitly indicate agreement or disagreement with an utter-
ance previously made by the other dialogue participant. In the latter
case, they typically end the dialogue. Other moves are closed when
the appropriate closure move exists. This closure move either iden-
tifies the disagreement, or refines where scope for disagreement
exists. For example, when one participant asserts a plan was exe-
cuted, and the other responds by asserting that some other plan was
executed, participants no longer needs to discuss the former plan to
identify disagreement. Instead, identifying why the latter plan was
(believed to be) executed is enough to identify the disagreement.
The precedence utterance sets a constraint between π and π ′.
We assume in addition that the effect maintains a total ordering
over plans in Π. We omit the requirement that π ′ > π appear in Π′
as the utterance’s effect is sufficient to detect disagreement.
Note that there is an asymmetry with regards to closure con-
ditions between assert(B,T ,T ′) and assert(¬B,T ,T ′). The former
can be closed by the latter, but not the other way around. The in-
tuition behind this is that the assertion of a belief must identify
the maximal interval during which the belief held. Providing an
overlapping interval where it does not hold counters the assertion,
but the new assertion must be explained (via awhy(¬B,T ) move)
rather than requiring another assertion for the belief holding.
Finally, note thatwhy moves have no effect on the dialogue par-
ticipants, as such moves simply request more information without
committing the utterer to any specific stance. However, the condi-
tion for uttering such a why move requires that the utterer have
appropriate beliefs (e.g., for why(B,T ), the utterer has to believe
that belief B held at time T . We do not impose a similar constraint
when asking why an action did/didn’t take place. Such utterances
initiate the dialogue and requires a participant to believe that the
other believes the action did/didn’t take place but places no re-
quirements on the utterer (i.e., constraints onM), and without a
response, does not constrain the other (i.e., does not constrain O).
4 DIALOGUE PROPERTIES
Having described the utterances dialogue participants can make, as
well as how a dialogue is initiated and terminates, we now turn our
attention to the properties of the dialogue. Due to space limitations,
we provide proof sketches for these properties.
The first property we consider reflects the fact that the model
held by one dialogue participant of the other always reflects the
latter’s true internal state if it did so previously.
Proposition 1. If, before move Di , for all indexes T , B′O[T ] ⊆
BM [T ], Π′O ⊆ ΠM , π ′O[T ] ∈ {∅} ∪ {πM [T ]}, τ ′e
O[T ] ∈ {∅} ∪
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Asks why action A took place at time T .
did (A, T ) why(¬A, T ) Asserts that action A took place at T . Ends the dialogue.
didnt (A, T ) why(A, T ) Asserts that action A did not occur at time T . Ends the dialogue.
asser t (π , T )
why(A, T + 1)
why(B, T + 1)
why(¬B, T + 1)
asser t (π ′, T )
Asserts that plan π was selected for execution at time T in response to a question regarding why an action
or belief held, or to counter a claim that another plan was executed at time T .
not_in_l ibrary(π ) asser t (π , T ) States that the dialogue participant is not aware of plan π . Ends the dialogue.
precedence(π , π ′) asser t (π , T ) Follows a second asser t (π ′, T ) move. States that plan π takes precedence over π ′. Ends the dialogue.
accept (π , T ) asser t (π , T ) Accepts that plan π was selected for execution at time T .
why(π , T ) asser t (π , T ) Asks why plan π was selected for execution at time T .
asser t (B, T , T ′) why(π , T ′ + 1) Asserts that belief B exists at all times between T and T ′ (inclusive).
asser t (¬B, T , T ′) asser t (B, T ′′, T ′) Asserts that B did not exist at all times between T and T ′.
accept (B, T , T ′) asser t (B, T , T ′) Accepts that B holds between T and T ′.
accept (¬B, T , T ′) asser t (¬B, T , T ′) Accepts that B does not hold between T and T ′.
why(B, T ) assert(B, T , T ′) Asks why belief B exists at time T .
why(¬B, T ) assert(¬B, T , T ′) Asks why belief B does not exist at time T .
percept (+B, T ) why(B, T + 1) Explains that B was perceived at time T in response to asking why it held at the next time point.
percept (−B, T ) why(¬B, T + 1) Explains that B was perceived being removed at time T .
Table 1: Legal dialogue utterances and what moves they follow, as well as their intuitive meaning.
{τMe [T ]}, and a′ex
O[T ] ∈ {∅} ∪ {aMex [T ]}, then this will also be the
case following the move.
Proof. We note that why moves do not affect the traces, and
therefore only consider the remaining move types.
Those moves which update an element of O′ do so in a way
consistent with M, giving us the desired result. □
Note that the update procedure described above also updates
the constraints in O
′
in a manner consistent with M. Therefore,
O′,O
′
are consistent with the program execution traceM.
Corollary 1. Given two dialogue participants ⟨M,O,O⟩, ⟨M ′,O′,O′⟩,
if M and O′ contain no contradictions prior to move Di , then they
will contain no contradictions following it.
Next, we demonstrate that our dialogues always terminate.
Theorem 4.1. Given a finite set of plans Π with a finite set of
propositions in their guards,G , then any dialogue starting with a why
question on an action will terminate.
Proof. We show that any move at time T either immediately
closes the dialogue, or is closed when move referring to a time
T ′ < T is made, closing it. Since the lowest possible time is 0 and
no moves may refer to time intervals below this, any dialogue must
terminate. We consider each possible move individually.
• why(¬A,T ): There are two possible responses: did(A,T ),
which closes the dialogue, orwhy(A,T ).
• why(A,T ): Possible responses are didnt(A,T ), which closes
the dialogue, or assert(π ,T − 1).
• assert(π ,T ): is closed immediately in case of accept ,
not_in_library and precedence moves, and we need only
considerwhy(π ,T ) and assert(π ′,T ). Given the move’s con-
ditions, a third assert of a plan cannot occur, meaning either
that why(π ′,T ) will be asked, or one of the closure moves
mentioned previously must be played. Therefore, we must
show thatwhy(π ,T ) will be closed.
• why(π ,T ): The only response is a set of assert(B,T ′,T − 1)
where T ′ ≤ T − 1. Each of these considers a time before T .
• assert(B,T ′,T ): An accept(B,T ′,T ) closes the move, and
we must therefore consider assert(¬B,T ′′,T ) andwhy(B,T )
moves, which as shown below, consider a time less than T .
• assert(¬B,T ′,T ): An accept(¬B,T ′,T ) closes the move. We
must therefore showwhy(¬B,T ) for a time before T .
• why(B,T )/why(¬B,T ): This move is closed by a
percept(+B,T − 1)/percept(−B,T − 1) move. The only other
response is assert(π ,T − 1), which considers a time T − 1.
It is also clear, given the requirement that staдe[0] = p, that no
dialogue will refer to a time T < 0. □
Turning to the question of dialogue complexity, we demonstrate
that the worst case length of a dialogue depends on the number of
plans in the plan library and the size of plan guards for each plan.
Corollary 2. The complexity of creating a dialogue is polynomial
in the size of the plan library and plan’s guard.
Proof. Let k be the total number of plans in the plan library.
Since moves cannot be repeated the maximum number of asserts
which can take place in any branch of the tree is k . Furthermore, the
dialogue can branch whenever awhy(π ,T ) is asked, with a factor
equal to the number of beliefs in the guard of the plan (call these д).
Finally, from the previous theorem, we know that a dialogue can
take place for at mostT time points, meaning that the upper bound
for the number of moves is O(дTk ). □
The following proposition states that if a disagreement within
the dialogue participant’s views (M) exists, its root cause — the
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Utterance Move Condition Closure Condition Effect
why(¬A, T ) staдeM [T ] = e did (A, T ) or why(A, T ) in the dialogue None
why(A, T ) staдeM [T ] = e didnt (A, T ) or asser t (π , T −1) s.t. π =
_ → [_, do(A)] in the dialogue.
None
why(π , T ) π = π O [T ] If π is of the form [b1, . . . , bn ] → [U , _]
then there is a move asser t (bi , _, T − 1)
for all i = 1, . . . , n.
None
why(B, T ) B ∈ BO [T ] When there is a move percept (+B, T −
1) or a move asser t (π , T − 1) such that
π is of the form _ → [U , _] and +B ∈ U .
None
why(¬B, T ) B < BO [T ] When there is a move percept (−B, T −
1) or a move asser t (π , T − 1) such that
π is of the form _ → [U , _] and −B ∈ U .
None
asser t (π , T ) staдeM [T ] = s and π = πM [T ]. If
following why(A, T + 1) (equivalently
why(B, T + 1) or why(¬B, T + 1)) then
π is of the form _ → [_, do(A)] (equiv-
alently _ → [[. . . , +B, . . .], _] or _ →
[[. . . , −B, . . .], _]).
Dialogue contains one of the following:
why(π , T )
asser t (π ′, T )
accept (π , T )
not_in_l ibrary(π )
precedence(π , π ′)
π ′O [T ] = π . If following an
asser t (π ′, T ) then π is added to
π ′[T ].
asser t (B, T , T ′) B ∈ BM [i] such that T ≤ i ≤ T ′ Dialogue contains why(B, T ′)
or accept (B, T , T ′) or
asser t (¬B, T ′′, T ′) (where T ′′ ≤ T ′).
B is added to all B′O [i] for allT ≤ i ≤ T ′
asser t (¬B, T , T ′) B < BM [i] such that T ≤ i ≤ T ′ Dialogue contains why(¬B, T ′) or
accept (¬B, T , T ′)
B is added to B′[i] for all T ≤ i ≤ T ′
did (A, T ) A = aMex [T ] Always closed a
′O
ex [T ] = A
didnt (A, T ) A , aMex [T ] Always closed a′ex [T ] = A
not_in_l ibrary(π ) π < ΠM Always closed π is added to Π′
precedence(π , π ′) The moves asser t (π , T ), asser t (π ′, T )
are in the dialogue. π , π ′ ∈ ΠM and π >
π ′ there.
Always closed π > π ′ ∈ Π′O
accept (π , T ) π = πM [T ] Always closed π ′O [T ] = π
accept (B, T , T ′) B ∈ BM [i] for all T ≤ i ≤ T ′ Always closed B is added to B′O [i] for all T ≤ i ≤ T ′
accept (¬B, T , T ′) B < BM [i] for all T ≤ i ≤ T ′ Always closed B is added to B′[i] for all T ≤ i ≤ T ′
percept (+B, T ) staдeM [T ] = p and +B is contained
within the set at the head of τMe [T ]
Always closed B is added to B′O [T + 1]
percept (−B, T ) staдeM [T ] = p and −B is contained
within the set at the head of τMe [T ]
Always closed B is added to B′[T + 1]
Table 2: Preconditions for an utterance; requirements to label the move closed; and utterance effects on dialogue participants.
difference in plans, perceptions or beliefs which led to it — can
be detected by the dialogue, assuming that some aspect of the
disagreement was already known to the dialogue participants (e.g.,
a difference in perceived action).
Proposition 2. Given two agents for which M , M ′ and for
which aMex [T ] , a
M ′
ex [T ], there is a dialogue which terminates with a
not_in_library, precedence or percept move.
Proof. We know from Theorem 4.1 that all dialogues terminate.
We show that there is at least one belief or plan that is not accepted.
Note that since there is a disagreement in actions, the dialogue
can initiate by asking why the disagreed upon action was executed,
meaning that we can ignore did/didnt moves.
Assume the proposition is false. This would mean that there is
agreement on which plan was executed. But there is a disagreement
in actions, which means thatM believes a plan with head aMex [T ]
was executed, whileM ′ believes a planwith headaMex [T ]. Therefore
this is a contradiction. The only way to close the dialogue is either
with a not_in_library, or precedence move, asking why the plan
was selected, or for another plan to be asserted leading to the same
arguments as above. Therefore only the question regardingwhy a
plan was chosen does not (eventually) close the move. In turn, this
leads to a disagreement about beliefs, which can only be resolved
via a percept disagreement, or by asking about further plans. over
which there must (as above) be a disagreement. □
It follows trivially that at least one dialogue participant will be
able to identify the disagreement by examining theirM and O.
The results above suggests a simple strategy for identifying
the root cause of a disagreement, namely to never accept when a
disagreement exists, and always askwhy about such disagreements.
Such disagreement dialogues can be contrasted from confirmatory
dialogues, where one participant may wish to confirm that the
other’s internal trace matches their own. A simple strategy for such
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confirmatory dialogues involves always askingwhy where possible,
acceptinд only when no other move exists.
Finally it can be easily shown that if bothM andM ′ are identical,
all dialogues will terminate with did/didnt moves (if the initialwhy
asks about a move that did/didn’t occur, or accept moves. In other
words, no disagreement will be identified.
5 IMPLEMENTATION
We have implemented SimpleBDI and our dialogue explanation
system in Python
3
. In our system two agents execute the program.
Perceptions are supplied to each agent individually at certain time
steps – allowing for differences in execution to occur because of
differing perceptions. Once execution is completed, a trace of the
actions performed by the two agents is used to detect points where
their behaviour diverged and these points can be used to start a
dialogue. For convenience the first agent in the dialogue is referred
to as the human, though it should be noted that our dialogues are
in fact generated by two software agents conversing.
Figure 2 shows a sample dialogue generated by our system for
Example 1. In this example when the robot reached the waypoint it
perceived that the terrain was no longer safe and so did not move to
the final location. The human asks why it did not make this move.
The robot and human agree that it was at the waypoint, and that
it had a goal to move to the final location, but they realise they
diagree that the terrain was safe and the robot explains that it no
longer believed the terrain to be safe from time point 15.
Figure 3 shows a dialogue for a different example. In this example
the robot is charged with performing routine remote inspections of
some site (e.g., a nuclear waste storage facility). When it performs
its daily inspection it should inspect the walls of the facility (if they
are scheduled for inspection) and the stored barrels (if they are
stored for inspection). In the situation where both inspections are
scheduled then inspecting the barrels takes precedence (indicated
implicitly by the ordering of the plans in the robot’s plan library).
This simple program is shown in Listing 2.
Code Listing 2
1d a i l y _ i n s p e c t i o n , b a r r e l s _ s c h e du l e d −>
2do ( i n s p e c t _ b a r r e l s )
3d a i l y _ i n s p e c t i o n , wa l l _ s chedu l ed −>
4do ( i n s p e c t _wa l l )
Figure 3 shows a dialogue generated for an instance where the
human believes that the wall inspection should have priority over
barrel inspection. The human asks why the robot did not inspect
the wall, the robot counters by asking why the human thought it
should inspect the wall. They both explain the plan they thought
applicable at that point and the human asserts that they thought
the wall inspection plan had priority.
6 DISCUSSION AND FUTUREWORK
A dialogue participant can make multiple utterances in some stages
of the dialogue. For example, a possible response to a why(π ,T )
move, which could be a single assert(b1, _,T − 1) move followed
by a sub-dialogue to close this assertion, after which a second
3
Source code can be found at https://github.com/jhudsy/BDIexplanation.git.
assert(b2, _,T − 2) move can be made followed by another sub-
dialogue. Alternatively, a response consisting of multiple moves of
the form assert(b1, _,T − 1), . . . ,assert(bn , _,T − 1) could be made,
closing the originalwhy move, but leaving all the assertions open
until dealt with. Rules covering turn taking (for example) would
then instantiate specific dialogues, but this would not affect the
dialogue properties described previously.
Our work makes an important assumption, namely that both
dialogue participants apply the SimpleBDI semantics correctly to
their internal version of the BDI program. In other words, the dis-
agreements we identify come about from omissions or differences
in the plan library, in the initial set of beliefs held by the dialogue
participants, or differences in beliefs regarding the input trace τe .
Extending the dialogue to deal with fallible participants who may
simply forget a belief or to apply a rule is an important strand of
future work, as doing so will provide for a dialogue more suited to
humans acting as dialogue participants.
At worst, our dialogue identifies only a single disagreement
between participants.We assume that between dialogues, partici-
pants update their beliefs about the program execution trace and
therefore, on rerunning the dialogue would identify different dis-
agreements. Determining how such belief updates should take place
is outside the scope of the paper, but serves as another important
avenue of future work. Related to this, allowing the participants to
update their M models during the trace (with concomitant effects
on O′ and O
′
) would enable more disagreements to be discovered
during single instance of the dialogue. Such work would require, at
the very least, the addition of moves to retract beliefs [? ].
Explanation has become an important area of AI research. Much
of the work in the domain focuses on the explainability of machine
learning systems [? ], but several recent papers consider explana-
tion of BDI and planning systems. For example, Caminada et al.
introduced a dialogue game to explain the behaviour of an auto-
mated planner [? ? ], building on ideas taken from proof dialogues
[? ]. We note that such work considers how to translate formal
utterances (as per our dialogue) into natural language, and believe
that this will be an interesting avenue of future work.
Several other argumentation based approaches to explanation
have been proposed in the literature (e.g., [? ? ]). While these ap-
proaches could be adapted to explain the behaviour of BDI systems,
we are unaware of such adaptations, which would — at least —
require instantiating BDI specific concepts related to time, beliefs,
goals etc as rules, which could then be combined into arguments,
and over which explanation dialogues could then operate. In con-
trast, our current work does not utilise an argumentation-theoretic
semantics to underpin it. Instead, it could be viewed as a dialogue
game built using argument schemes and critical questions [? ] cre-
ated for the BDI domain, in the tradition of work in informal logic
[? ] and practical reasoning [? ].
Winikoff [? ] and Hindriks [? ] both consider providing expla-
nations for BDI languages in the context of debugging. Hindriks’
work was later expanded by Koeman et al. [? ]. These systems all
generate explanations using a formal semantics over a trace of
program execution. Harbers [? ] generates explanations for BDI
systems using goal hierarchy paired with a behaviour log. Winikoff
et al. [? ] uses a concept of preferences to help produce explanations
AAMAS ’21, May 3–7, 2021, Online Louise A. Dennis and Nir Oren
human: Why Not move2 at 17
robot: Why move2 at 17
human: Selected at_waypoint,goal_move_to_location,safe_terrain, ->
do(move2),-goal_move_to_location,-at_waypoint,+at_location,+goal_take_sample, at 16
robot: Why select at_waypoint,goal_move_to_location,safe_terrain, ->
do(move2),-goal_move_to_location,-at_waypoint,+at_location,+goal_take_sample, at 16
human: +at_waypoint at time 14 and it remained so until at least 16
robot: I agree +at_waypoint between 14 and 16
human: +goal_move_to_location at time 11 and it remained so until at least 16
robot: I agree +goal_move_to_location between 11 and 16
human: +safe_terrain at time 6 and it remained so until at least 16
robot: -safe_terrain at time 15 and it remained so until at least 16
human: Why -safe_terrain at 15
robot: I perceived -safe_terrain at 15
Figure 2: Sample Dialogue for Example 1
human: Why Not inspect_wall at 14
robot: Why inspect_wall at 14
human: Selected wall_scheduled,daily_inspection, -> do(inspect_wall), at 13
robot: Selected barrels_scheduled,daily_inspection, -> do(inspect_barrels), at 13
human: wall_scheduled,daily_inspection, -> do(inspect_wall), has precedence in my plan library
Figure 3: Sample Dialogue for Plan Priority Example
from BDI program execution traces. While all of these systems —
like us — use execution traces to provide explanations for BDI pro-
gram, none compare conflicting traces through dialogue to guide
the generation of the explanation towards the concerns of the user.
Sreedharan et al. [? ] consider the question of explanations in
the context of AI Planning and, like us, explicitly identify the need
to reconcile the human mental model with execution to generate
an explanation. They pre-generate a set of explanations that are
intended to reveal specific aspects of the Planning system’s model
(for instance that a particular location must be visited in partic-
ular circumstances) and then use machine learning to determine
which explanations are most likely to explain which observable
transitions in the system behaviour. These are then presented to
users when they label some particular transition as inexplicable.
[? ] describes how hypothetical plans can be generated which can
be compared to the original plan, serving a similar function to our
two dialogue participants. However, these approaches ignore the
dialogical aspects of our solution and are grounded in planning,
reducing the importance of concepts such as percepts.
Apart from the research mentioned above, there are several ad-
ditional strands of future work we intend to explore. First, as noted
by Caminada et al. and others, there are strong links between di-
alogues and formal argumentation theory. Move sequences such
as assert(π ,T ), assert(π ′,T ) imply a contradiction in the dialogue
participant’s views which — through the dialogue — are instanti-
ated into attacking arguments. We therefore intend to investigate
an argument-theoretic semantics for the dialogue presented in this
paper, potentially allowing for stronger links with other explainable
AI approaches underpinned by argumentation [? ? ? ], potentially
allowing for more efficient dialogues through the introduction of
concepts such as burden of proof [? ]. We also intend to investi-
gate the effects of strategy on dialogue properties more deeply.
While our results provide worst-case upper bounds for dialogue
length, strategies regarding what utterance to make, built on what
the dialogue participant wishes to achieve and what they know
about the other participant [? ] may — at least in the average case
— significantly reduce the number of moves that need to be made.
Finally, extending SimpleBDI may result in more complex dialogues.
Allowing, for example, a non-strict ordering over plans could allow
participants to argue about the unobserved effects of plans, requir-
ing looking forwards as backwards over time, and such enrichment
could be a fruitful direction of future work.
7 CONCLUSIONS
We presented a family of dialogues allowing two dialogue partici-
pants to identify if, and where, a divergence of views exists between
them with regards to a BDI agent’s operation. Our dialogue aims
to be general enough to capture two external observers discussing
the behaviour of a (third) BDI agent, but we believe that in practice,
one of the dialogue participants will be the BDI agent, seeking to
explain its actions to the second participant, typically a human.
Such explanations then focus on divergences in the views of the
participants with regards to the perceptions, plans and underlying
beliefs of the BDI system, and we show that when a divergence
exists with regards to what action should have taken place, the
dialogue enables the root cause of the divergence to be detected.
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